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In this paper we consider learning from search as a mechanism to understand
the relationship between unemployment duration and search outcomes as a labor
market equilibrium. We rely on the assumption that workers do not have precise
knowledge of their job ﬁnding probabilities and therefore, learn about them from
their search histories. Embedding this assumption in a model of the labor market
with directed search, we provide an equilibrium theory of declining reservation wages
over unemployment spells. After each period of search, unemployed workers update
their beliefs about the market matching eﬃciency. We characterize situations where
reservation wages decline with unemployment duration. Consequently, the wage dis-
tribution is non-degenerate, despite the facts that matches are homogeneous and
search is directed. Moreover, aggregate matching probability decreases with unem-
ployment duration, in contrast to individual workers’ matching probability, which
increases over individual unemployment spells. The diﬃculty in establishing these
results is that learning generates non-diﬀerentiable value functions and multiple so-
lutions to a worker’s optimization problem. We overcome this diﬃculty by exploiting
a connection between convexity of a worker’s value function and the property of
supermodularity.
JEL classiﬁcations: E24, D83, J64.
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Workers with longer unemployment duration also have lower permanent incomes.1 Moti-
vated by this observation, we explore learning from search as the mechanism underlying the
relationship between unemployment duration and search outcomes. The main assumption
is that unemployed workers do not have precise knowledge of their job ﬁnding probabilities
and, therefore, learn about them from their search histories. Embedding this assumption
in a labor market with directed search, we construct an equilibrium theory of declining
reservation wages over unemployment spells. This model allows us to consider jointly the
search behavior of workers, the creation of jobs, and the wage distribution as functions of
unemployment duration. The theory formalizes a notion akin to that of discouragement,
as unemployed workers become more pessimistic about the probability of ﬁnding a job as
they update their beliefs downward over their spell of unemployment.
To present the theory in the simplest format, we focus on the search behavior of ex ante
identical workers and ﬁrms. The aggregate labor market consists of many markets, and we
think of each single market in terms of the mix of physical characteristics of that particu-
lar labor market, such as geography and occupation. Accordingly, these characteristics are
idiosyncratic to the workers and ﬁrms in that market, rather than economy-wide character-
istics. In this context, unemployed workers’ search conveys information about the matching
eﬃciency and, therefore, about the worker’s job ﬁnding probability. After an unemployed
worker searches and fails to ﬁnd employment, the worker views this search outcome as bad
news and revises his beliefs about the matching probability downwards. In equilibrium,
each market becomes segmented, containing workers with diﬀerent unemployment dura-
tions and, thus, diﬀe r e n tb e l i e f sa b o u tt h em a t c h i n ge ﬃciency in their market. Firms in
these markets cater to the preferences of workers with diﬀerent beliefs and supply the jobs
that workers seek in all those markets, but with diﬀerent terms of trade. In particular, as
an unemployed worker searches for a job and fails to ﬁnd a match, he becomes pessimistic
about his chances to ﬁnd a job and, hence, chooses to search for jobs which are easier to
get. In a directed search equilibrium, those jobs necessarily come with lower wages, as the
ﬁrms that provide the jobs also make the tradeoﬀ between the matching probability and
wages.2 Thus, our theory provides an explanation for wage inequality among workers with
1See e.g. Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Machin and Manning (1999).
2In principle, the matching eﬃciency could also be aﬀected by worker-speciﬁc characteristics, in which
case workers may also be learning about themselves, that is, about their own ability to ﬁnd and elicit a
job oﬀer. Here we disregard this latter case in the interest of simplicity – this would complicate the ﬁrms’
learning problem, introducing further heterogeneity.
1identical skills.3
Our theory is related in spirit to the work of Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), who pro-
pose a model of workers’ learning about the distribution of wages as an explanation for the
fact that reservation wages decline with the duration of unemployment spells. Their idea
is intuitive and can be viewed as an attempt to understand a form of “discouragement”
in the labor market. Wage oﬀers convey information about the unknown distribution of
wages. Accordingly, wage oﬀers lower than expected lead to a reduction in the worker’s
reservation wage, as the worker revises his beliefs about the wage distribution downwards.
This learning process generates endogenous selection, because workers with longer unem-
ployment duration are precisely those who have drawn and rejected relatively lower wages
and, therefore, they perceive the jobs available to them as jobs oﬀering low wages.
However, Burdett and Vishwanath examine only one side of the market by assuming
that the wage distribution is exogenous. If one considers an equilibrium, instead, learning
by the market participants will aﬀect ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers. Thus, the wage distribution itself
needs to be explained rather than assumed, in order to address the connection between
reservation wages, job creation and equilibrium wages. Unfortunately, endogenizing the
wage distribution in the Burdett-Vishwanath model is not tractable, partly because the
distribution acts as a state variable in an individual’s decision problem. Moreover, it
is more intuitive to formulate the learning process directly as one about fundamental
characteristics of the market, such as the matching eﬃciency and productivity, rather than
the wage distribution which is generated by these characteristics.
In this paper we provide such a formulation of search and learning in an equilibrium.
The characteristic which workers try to learn about is associated with labor market fric-
tions. As a concrete way to formalize this type of uncertainty, we assume that individuals
do not know precisely the matching eﬃciency given by the exogenous matching technology.
Faced with this uncertainty, workers learn about the probability of ﬁnding a job through
their private search histories. Moreover, we formulate search as a directed process. That
is, each ﬁrm oﬀers a wage knowing that his oﬀer will aﬀect his matching probability, and
each worker observes all wage oﬀers in the economy before choosing to apply to one.4 How-
ever, an individual’s matching probability is still uncertain and, hence, learning is useful,
3A related possibility is that search intensity also varies with the duration of unemployment. For
instance, one could add a participation decision in the present context. Intuitively, workers would quit
search after a suﬃciently long unemployment spell. In practice discouraged workers may rather switch to
occupations where they are less productive. Our analysis may help understand this process as well.
4For an earlier formulation of directed search, see Peters (1984, 1991). Other examples include Moen
(1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Shi (2001) and Burdett et al. (2001).
2because the individual does not know which wage oﬀers belong to his own local market.
A so p p o s e dt ou n d i r e c t e ds e a r c h( e . g . ,B u r d e tt and Vishwanath, 1988), the directed search
framework eliminates the direct dependence of an individual’s decision on the wage distri-
bution, which reduces the dimensionality of the state variables for an individual’s decision
problem, and hence makes the model tractable.
In addition to a tractable formulation of an equilibrium with learning, we provide an
analytical procedure for resolving a main theoretical problem in the analysis of learning.
This problem is caused by convexity of the value function. Because search outcomes
generate variations in a worker’s posterior beliefs about the matching eﬃciency, search is
informative only if these variations in beliefs are valuable to the worker, i.e., if the worker’s
value function is strictly convex in beliefs. Although the literature (e.g., Easley and Kiefer,
1988) recognizes that such convexity is likely to lead to multiple solutions and to render the
ﬁrst-order conditions inapplicable, it has either ignored the diﬃculty or focused on corner
solutions (e.g. Balvers and Cosimano, 1993). To establish the result of declining reservation
wages, all solutions need to be characterized. We resolve this diﬃculty by exploring a
connection between convexity of the value function and the property of supermodularity.
The connection is not obvious at the ﬁrst glance. In our model, neither a worker’s
current payoﬀ nor his objective function is supermodular as is often required in applica-
tions of supermodularity (see Topkis, 1998). Moreover, a worker’s value function is convex,
rather than concave as is required in applications of supermodularity to dynamic program-
ming (e.g., Amir et al., 1991). However, we can transform a worker’s objective function
into a supermodular function, and this transformation relies heavily on convexity of the
value function. Then, (weak) monotonicity of workers’ reservation wages follows from stan-
dard results in Topkis (1998). In turn, monotone optimal choices imply that the workers’
reservation wage declines with unemployment duration.
We then provide conditions under which optimal choices are interior and show that
reservation wages are strictly declining with unemployment duration in this case. Under
the same conditions, we show that the value function is diﬀerentiable in a limited sense,
i.e., diﬀerentiable in future periods at those beliefs along the equilibrium path. In turn,
this implies that the paths of equilibrium choices and induced beliefs are unique almost
everywhere and that non-uniqueness can occur at most in the ﬁrst period of search.
Our theory generates “true” positive relationship between an unemployed individual’s
transition to employment and his unemployment duration; at the same time, the theory is
consistent with a negative cross-sectional (aggregate) relationship between unemployment
duration and unemployment outﬂows to employment. True positive duration dependence
3arises because workers optimally search for jobs that are easier to get as their reservation
wages decline. Consequently, each worker’s job ﬁnding rate increases over his unemploy-
ment spell. However, negative duration dependence can arise simultaneously as a feature
of the cross-sectional distribution of unemployed workers because workers with longer un-
employment durations are precisely those who have failed to ﬁnd a match previously and,
at every duration, they are more likely to be in markets with lower matching eﬃciency.
In practice, assessing the relationship between unemployment duration and unemployment
outﬂo w si sp r o b l e m a t i c ,a si ti sd i ﬃcult to identify the extent to which it is true duration
dependence or rather worker heterogeneity that underlies the data. Nonetheless, as dis-
cussed by Machin and Manning (1999), there is little evidence of true negative duration
dependence after controlling for heterogeneity.
Other explanations for the observed relationship between unemployment duration and
search outcomes have been suggested in the literature. One is that declines in wealth
over unemployment spells induce both declining reservation wages and falling job ﬁnd-
ing probabilities (Burdett, 1977, Mortensen, 1977). Another is that the human capital of
unemployed workers deteriorates with the duration of unemployment (Lazear, 1976). Al-
ternatively, if workers diﬀer in their (unobservable) productivities, unemployment duration
may become a signal of low productivity (Lockwood, 1991).5 These explanations cannot
address the evidence adequately. For example, although the ﬂow from unemployment to
employment typically has a spike as the expiration of unemployment beneﬁts approaches,
the ﬂow continues to decline after the expiration.6 On skill depreciation, it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd direct evidence that workers with longer unemployment duration are less productive,
whereas indirect evidence does not indicate an important role of skill depreciation. Despite
the lack of evidence, the common perception that there is substantial unemployment “scar-
ring” largely associated with skill depreciation has lent support to government sponsored
training programs.7 This is so even though such programs often seem to fail to increase
the trainees’ job ﬁnding rates.8 Related to this subject, a voluminous literature on social
5Blanchard and Diamond (1994) explore the possibility that employers may base employment decisions
on unemployment duration as an arbitrary ranking device. They note that the ranking scheme is not
robust to directed search and homogeneous workers.
6Even after controling for wealth, Alexopoulos and Gladden (2006) have found that reservation wages
still fall signiﬁcantly over the unemployment duration.
7See e.g., Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory (2001).
8For instance, Ham and LaLonde (1996) ﬁnd that, controlling for sample selection, the National Sup-
ported Work Demonstration training program raised trainees’ employment rates solely by lengthening their
employment durations.
4psychology emphasizes the eﬀect of unemployment duration on psychological well-being.9
However, the eﬀect of unemployment on distress is often found to be short-lived, disap-
pearing with re-employment (e.g., Kessler, Turner and House, 1989). Work in this area
also suggests that young unemployed workers value employment more, rather than less, as
the duration of their unemployment spell increases (see McFadyen and Thomas, 1997).
Our model also provides an alternative explanation for wage dispersion. In previous
models of directed search with homogeneous workers and ﬁrms (see earlier citations), wage
dispersion is very limited and, often, degenerate. Our model generates rich dispersion of
equilibrium wages by turning ex ante identical agents into heterogeneous ones who diﬀer
in posterior beliefs about the market. This mechanism of wage dispersion can be useful for
explaining the fact that about 70 percent of the variation in wages remains unexplained by
observed worker characteristics (see Mortensen, 2003). In particular, the mechanism has
the testable implication that diﬀerences in unemployment duration among homogeneous
workers may be an important factor of wage dispersion among workers earning relatively
low wages. Contrasting with other explanations that also build on search frictions (e.g.
Butters, 1977, Burdett and Judd, 1983, and Burdett and Mortensen, 1998), our explanation
features directed search and focuses on workers’ learning from search.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 establishes existence of an equilibrium and characterizes the properties of the
value of search. In Section 4 we show that reservation wages decline with unemployment
duration. Section 5 provides conditions under which reservation wages are strictly declining
and explores diﬀerentiability of the value function. Section 6 characterizes the steady state
distribution of workers. Section 7 concludes and the Appendix collects all proofs.
2. The Model
2.1. Agents, Markets and Matching
Time is discrete and all agents discount the future at a rate r>0. There are a large number
of workers and ﬁr m s . Aw o r k e ri se i t h e re m p l o y e do ru n e m p l o y e d . W h e ne m p l o y e d ,a
worker produces y>0 units of goods. When unemployed, a worker searches for a job and
the utility of leisure is normalized to zero.
The economy consists of a continuum of local markets, with mass 1. We think of each
single local market in terms of the mix of physical characteristics of that particular labor
market, such as geography and occupation. These characteristics are idiosyncratic to the
9See Darity and Goldsmith (1996) and McFadyen and Thomas (1997).
5workers and the ﬁrms in that market, rather than economy-wide characteristics. Workers
are assigned to one of these local markets at random, remaining in the same local market
as long as they continue to search. There is free entry of ﬁrms in every local market. Local
markets may diﬀer in terms of their matching eﬃciency. A fraction p ∈ (0,1) of all local
markets have matching eﬃciency mH. The remaining markets have matching eﬃciency
mL ∈ (0,m H). Thus, m denotes the common type of workers and ﬁr m si nag i v e nl o c a l
market with matching eﬃciency m.10
T h ek e yf e a t u r eo ft h em o d e li st h a tt h et r u ev a l u eo ft h em a t c h i n ge ﬃciency m in
every local market is unknown, which workers can learn about from their individual unem-
ployment histories. We assume that individual search histories are private information. In
addition, we suppose that agents observe all aggregates, but they do not observe the local
l a b o rm a r k e tc o n d i t i o n ss p e c i ﬁct oa n yg i v e nl o c a lm a r k e t .
Each local market consists of a continuum of submarkets indexed by x. The matching
probability of a worker in a submarket x is assumed to be mx. The domain of x is
X =[ 0 ,1/mH]. In any given local market, a submarket x is characterized by a wage
level, W(x), and a tightness, λ(x) (i.e., the vacancy-unemployment ratio). The functions
W(.)a n dλ(.) are public information, but the matching probability in each submarket is
unknown. Note that two submarkets can be indexed by the same x but they may belong to
diﬀerent local markets that diﬀer in the matching eﬃciency. In the equilibrium analyzed
below, the functions W(.)a n dλ(.)a r et h es a m ei na l ll o c a lm a r k e t s ,a n ds oo b s e r v i n g
the wage and tightness in a submarket does not reveal the matching eﬃciency of the local
market in which the particular submarket is located.
Search is directed as follows. In each period, ﬁrms and workers in a given local market
can choose which submarket to enter. We refer to this choice as an agent’s search decision,
because it aﬀects the agent’s matching probability. We also refer to W(x)a st h ereservation
wage of a worker who chooses to enter the submarket x. Search is directed in the sense that
an agent’s choice of a submarket involves a tradeoﬀ between the wage and the tightness,
because the two characteristics are negatively related to each other across submarkets.
The equilibrium wage in a submarket “clears” the submarket in the sense that the induced
entry of ﬁrms and workers is consistent with the tightness in that submarket. We will
provide a formal deﬁnition of a competitive search equilibrium later.
To make precise the meaning of the matching eﬃciency, let us specify the matching
function in a submarket x as mF(u(x),v(x)), where u(x) is the number of unemployed
10Alternatively, one can think of mi as a worker’s characteristic. Then, the logic of the problem would
be similar, but some details of the analysis would change, introducing unnecessary complications.
6workers and v(x) the number of vacancies in submarket x. Then, x = F(u(x),v(x))/u(x)
and λ(x)=v(x)/u(x). It is important to emphasize that individuals do not observe u(x)
or v(x)f o re a c hx, although they observe λ(x),F(x)a n dW(x).
We impose the following standard assumption on the function F:
Assumption 1. The function F(u,v): (i) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice
diﬀerentiable in each argument, (ii) is linearly homogeneous, and (iii) has F(1,0) = 0 and
F(1,∞) > 1/mH.







00(x) > 0, for all x ∈ (0,1/mH). (2.1)
The recruiting probability of a ﬁrm in submarket x is mx/λ(x). The above properties
of λ imply that a ﬁrm’s recruiting probability decreases with x. That is, if it is easy for a
worker to ﬁnd a job at x,i tm u s tb ed i ﬃcult for a ﬁrm to recruit at x. Posting a vacancy
for a period in any local market requires the ﬁrm to incur the vacancy cost c ∈ (0,y). To





The following examples of the matching function satisfy Assumption 1 and will be used
in various parts below:
Example 2.1. (i) One example of F is the CES function: F(u,v)=[ ( 1− α)uρ + αvρ]
1/ρ,






















A special case of this example is the Cobb-Douglas function, where ρ =0 ,w h i c hl e a d s





x(1−α)/α. (ii) Another example is the

















(e1/λ − 1)(e1/λ − 1 − 1/λ)
.
7To focus on search, we assume that employment is an absorbing state. In this envi-
ronment, the steady state distribution of workers is non-trivial only if there is a ﬂow into
unemployment. For this reason, we assume that the labor force grows at the constant rate
n.T h u s , i f L is the labor force at the beginning of period t,am a s snL of new workers
enters the labor market in period t, joining the pool of unemployed workers that period.
2.2. Learning from Unemployment
Agents update their beliefs on m a f t e ro b s e r v i n gw h e t h e ro rn o tt h e yh a v eam a t c h .T h e
updating depends on the particular submarket into which the agent just searched. To
describe the updating process, it is convenient to express the beliefs in terms of their
expected types. Let the initial prior expectation of m be μ0 ∈ (mL,m H), for all agents
(workers and ﬁrms). This prior mean belief can be calculated from the distribution of
workers across local markets when they ﬁrst enter the economy, and it is common to both
workers and ﬁrms: μ0 = pmH +( 1− p)mL,w h e r ep ∈ (0,1).
Consider the updating process for a worker. It should be noted that public information
about aggregate statistics does not reveal any valuable information to individual workers
beyond what is already contained in the equilibrium functions of wages, W(.), and tight-
ness, λ(.). Since these functions are identical across all local markets, and agents do not
observe the behavior of others in their own local market, the only valuable information
to a worker is his private history of search outcomes. Let P(mi) be the prior probability
with which m = mi,w h e r ei ∈ {H,L}.L e t μ be the expected value of m according to
this prior belief. Note that the prior distribution of m is Bernoulli, with E(m)=μ and








Let k ∈ {0,1} be the matching outcome in the current period, where k =0i n d i c a t e s
that the worker fails to get a match and k = 1 indicates that the worker succeeds in getting
am a t c h .T h e n ,
P(mi|x; k =1 )=
mi
μ




Because the conditional distribution of m is Bernoulli, then conditional on k ∈ {0,1},t h e
mean and variance of m are:
E(m|k)=mHP(mH|k)+mL(1 − P(mH|k))
Va r(m|k)=( mH − mL)
2P(mH|k)(1 − P(mH|k)).
8Note that, if x<1/mH,w eh a v eP(mH|k =0 )> 0 for all μ >m L. Thus, if the initial
mean belief μ0 exceeds mL,t h e nE(m|k) >m L for both k =0a n dk =1 .
This updating process has two preliminary properties. First, the sequence {E(m)} is
a Markov process. Second, a worker’s mean beliefs E(m)a r eas u ﬃcient statistic for the
worker’s unemployment history.
Search in a market with a high x generates outcomes that are more informative than
outcomes of search in a market with a low x. More precisely, a higher x causes a mean-
preserving spread in the distribution of the posterior expectation E(m|k). To see this, note
that ex ante k is a random variable, and so is the posterior expectation E(m|k). The mean
of this posterior expectation is E(E(m|k)) = E(m)=μ, which is unaﬀected by x.T h e
variance of the posterior expectation is:












This variance increases with x.
The informational content of x is asymmetric with respect to the matching outcome.
For a worker who succeeds in ﬁnding a match, the posterior, P(m|k =1 ) ,i sn o taf u n c t i o n
of x.T h ep o s t e r i o rm e a nb e l i e fi nt h i sc a s ei sE(m|k =1 )=mH +mL −mHmL/μ,w h i c h
is also independent of x. Therefore, a worker’s choice of submarket, x,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the
information contained in a successful search outcome. In contrast, for a worker who fails
to ﬁnd a match, the posterior, P(mH|k = 0), decreases with x. That is, the higher x of
a submarket in which a worker searches for a job, the more the worker will reduce the
posterior on the matching eﬃciency after he fails to ﬁnd a match. This is because ﬁnding a
m a t c hi nas u b m a r k e tw i t hah i g h e rx is supposed to be easier, and failure to ﬁnd a match
there should induce the worker to revise the beliefs downward more sharply.11
We will focus on unemployed workers’ decisions. For this purpose, it is useful to write
separately the updating process of a worker who fails to ﬁnd a job. For such a worker,
we refer to the mean of the beliefs, μ, simply as the beliefs. The posterior belief of an
unemployed worker who searches and fails to ﬁnd a job is given by
H(x,μ) ≡ E(m|k =0 )=mH −
1 − xmL
1 − xμ
(mH − μ). (2.3)
This posterior expectation has the following properties, whose veriﬁcation is straightfor-
ward and hence omitted here:
11This asymmetry of the role of x in the posterior holds more generally in the following way. Suppose
that the job ﬁnding probability is ϕ(x,m). If ϕ(x,mH)/ϕ(x,mL)i si n d e p e n d e n to fx,t h e nP(m|k =1 )i s
independent of x but P(mH|k = 0) decreases in x.
9Lemma 2.2. The function H(x,μ) satisﬁes: (i) H1 < 0;( i i )H2 > 0, (iii) H11 =
2μ
1−xμH1 <
0 and H22 = 2x
1−xμH2 > 0;( i v )μ(1 − xμ)H12 − H1 − μ2H2 = −mHmL.
Property (i) states that a higher x reduces the worker’s posterior beliefs after the
worker fails to ﬁnd a match, as discussed above. In particular, property (i) implies that
H(x,μ) < μ for all x>0a n dμ >m L. Thus, a worker’s beliefs about the local market’s
matching eﬃciency decrease over time as the number of search failures increases. Of course,
if a worker’s beliefs have reached mL, there is no further updating; that is, H(x,mL)=mL
for all x. Property (ii) states that, for any given x, a worker with higher prior beliefs will
also have higher posterior beliefs. Properties (iii) and (iv) will be useful later.
2.3. The Value of Search
Consider an unemployed worker who enters a period with beliefs, μ.L e tV (μ)b eh i sv a l u e
function. If he chooses to search in a submarket x, the expected probability of ﬁnding a
match is xμ. Suppose that the worker accepts the match, which will yield wage W(x).
Because employment is permanent, the present value of the job is W(x)/r.I ft h ew o r k e r
does not ﬁnd a job in the current period, he will revise the beliefs to H(x,μ)a n dc o n t i n u e
to search in the next period. In that case, the expected value from the next period onward








The above calculation presumes that a worker accepts the oﬀer, which may not be true
in principle. Both workers and ﬁrms may have incentive to engage in a particular form
of “experimentation”, searching during a period solely to gather information and, thus,
refusing to enter a match once they learn that a match has occurred. A worker that has
searched in a submarket x and found a match will revise his beliefs to E(m|k =1 )=
mH + mL − mHmL/μ, as explained above. Suppose that the worker chooses to reject the
match and continue to search in the next period. Then, his expected payoﬀ of entering a
submarket x to search today is:
R
e(x,μ) ≡ xμ






We do not think that this form of experimentation is important in practice, unless
it is associated with heterogeneous matches. Thus, we rule out such experimentation by
imposing two assumptions. First, we assume that ﬁrms commit to accepting all success-
ful matches. This assumption can be viewed as a natural implication of the maintained
10assumption of directed search; that is, a ﬁrm is committed to accepting a worker at the
posted wage as long as the worker has the speciﬁed productivity. As an additional justiﬁca-
tion, note that the main motivation for a ﬁrm to reject a match in reality is to search for a
more productive match. This motivation does not exist in our model, because all matches
are homogeneous. Second, we require that a worker should always accept a match which
he searches for, as speciﬁed in the assumption below. A suﬃcient condition to validate this
assumption will be provided in Lemma 3.1.
Assumption 2. maxx∈X R(x,μ) ≥ maxx∈X Re(x,μ) for all μ ∈ M.
It can be veriﬁed that the inequality stated in the assumption must hold for values of
μ that are suﬃciently close to mL and for values of μ that are suﬃciently close to mH.
Below we shall provide an intuitive suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o ri tt oh o l df o ra l lμ ∈ M (see
Lemma 3.1). Under Assumption 2, the value of search under beliefs μ is given by:
V (μ)=m a x
x∈X R(x,μ). (2.6)
Denote the set of optimal decisions as G(μ)=a r g m a x x∈X R(x,μ) and a selection from
G(μ)a sg(μ). The reservation wage can be written as w(μ)=W(g(μ)).
Before analyzing the solution to the above decision problem, consider the behavior of
ﬁrms. Firms also choose which submarket to enter to post vacancies and, after observing
the matching outcome, they update their beliefs. Their initial prior belief is the same as
the workers’, μ0. The updating process of a ﬁrm is similar to that of the workers’. Let
xv describe the submarket which a ﬁrm enters, for a given local market with matching
eﬃciency m.I ft h eﬁrm ﬁnds a match, its posterior expectation of m does not depend on
xv.I ft h eﬁrm fails to ﬁnd a match, then the posterior expectation of m decreases in xv.
Because the ﬁrm’s matching probability is mxv/λ(xv), then the ﬁrm’s expectation of m
after failing to ﬁnd a match in one period is H(xv/λ(xv),μ0), where H is deﬁn e di n( 2 . 3 ) .
Note that H(xv/λ(xv),μ0) < μ0 for all xv ∈ (0,1/mH).
Let J(μv) be the value of a vacancy given that the ﬁrm’s mean belief at the beginning
of a period is μv.W i t hf r e ee n t r y ,J(μ0) = 0. Because H(xv/λ(xv),μ0) < μ0 for all xv < 1,
as explained above, continuing to post a vacancy under the beliefs H(xv/λ(xv),μ0) yields
an e g a t i v ev a l u e .T h a ti s ,aﬁrm will always exit the market after one period of search if
the search fails to ﬁnd a match in that period.12 This result allows us to simplify a ﬁrm’s











12A positive entry cost would explain why vacancies may last longer than one period.
11The ﬁrst-order condition of the above problem involves the wage function W and its
derivative. This can be alternatively viewed as a diﬀerential equation for the wage function.
Without an initial condition, this diﬀerential equation has a continuum of solutions. The
indeterminacy simply says that there are many levels of xv that are optimal for the ﬁrm.
Put diﬀerently, a ﬁrm is willing to enter into any submarket, provided that the wage in
the submarket is consistent with the free-entry condition, which we discuss next.
2.4. Free-Entry of Firms and the Equilibrium Deﬁnition
Free-entry of ﬁrms implies J(μ0) = 0. Together with the ﬁrm’s value function, this condi-







For future reference, it is useful to note that, for all x ∈ X, the function W(x)i st w i c e
continuously diﬀerentiable and it has the following properties:
(i)0<W(x) ≤ y;( ii) W
0(x) < 0, (iii)2 W
0(x)+xW
00(x) < 0. (2.8)
Part (i) is ensured by (2.2) and other parts by (2.1). Part (ii) says that a higher employment
probability comes together with a lower wage. This is necessary for directed search to be
meaningful, as it provides a tradeoﬀ between the wage and the tightness of the submarket.
As such, it is a necessary condition for inducing ﬁrms to enter the submarket. Part (iii) is
implied by λ00(x) > 0, and it says that the function xW(x)i sc o n c a v ei nx.
Focus on stationary equilibria. An equilibrium consists of workers’ decision x, ﬁrms’
decision xv,a n daw a g ef u n c t i o nW(x), that meet the following requirements. (i) Given
the wage function and a worker’s belief at the beginning of a period, the worker’s choice
of the submarket obeys the rule x = g(μ). (ii) Given the initial belief μ0 and the wage
function, a ﬁrm’s choice is optimal; that is, xv = gv(μ). (iii) Conditional on unsuccessful
search, a worker’s beliefs are updated according to H(g(μ),μ)a n daﬁrm’s according to
H(gv(μ)/λ(gv(μ)),μ). (iv) Consistency: for every x in every local market, the mass of all
ﬁrms who choose gv(μ)=x divided by the mass of all workers who choose g(μ)=x is
equal to λ(x). (v) Free-entry: for each local market, the wage function W satisﬁes (2.7).
In the above deﬁnition we have left out the steady-state conditions on worker ﬂows
and the wage distribution, which will be characterized in section 6. We deliberately do so
in order to emphasize the feature of the model that individuals’ decisions and matching
probabilities can be analyzed without any reference to the wage distribution. Instead, all
12that is required for such an analysis is the wage function W(.) and the tightness function
λ(.), which are determined by ﬁrms’ free-entry condition and the matching function. This
feature makes the analysis tractable by reducing the dimensionality of the state variables
for individuals’ decision problems signiﬁcantly (i.e., by inﬁnity).13 As an implication of
directed search, this feature is not possessed by models of undirected search such as Burdett
and Vishwanath (1988). In the latter models, an individual’s search decision depends on
the wage distribution which, in turn, evolves as individuals learn about the market. Solving
for these dynamics of the wage distribution, even quantitatively, is a daunting task.
To conclude the description of the model, let us emphasize the information structure.
The economy consists of many local markets, and each local market has many submarkets,
one for each duration of unemployment. The actual labor market outcomes are diﬀerent
across local markets with diﬀerent matching eﬃciency. However, agents do not know the
matching eﬃciency of their own local market. The distribution of labor market outcomes
across local markets is common knowledge, but it conveys no useful information to the
agents about their own local markets. As a result, each agent’s optimal choice is a function
of their beliefs and, therefore, of their unemployment duration only, but not of the matching
eﬃciency of the agent’s local market.
3. Equilibrium Learning with Search
Let us now analyze a worker’s optimization problem, (2.6). When choosing a submarket
x, the worker faces two considerations. One is the familiar tradeoﬀ between wages and the
matching probability in models of directed search. That is, a submarket with a higher x
has a lower wage and a higher probability of ﬁnding a match. Another consideration is
learning from the search outcome. As discussed earlier, search in a submarket with a high
x (i.e., a low wage) is more informative about the matching eﬃciency in that market than
search in a submarket with a low x. To see how the model captures the value of learning,
we examine the value function.
It is easy to see that the mapping deﬁned by the right-hand side of (2.6) is a contraction.
Using the features in (2.8), standard arguments show that a unique value function V exists,
which is positive, bounded and continuous on M =[ mL,m H]( s e eT h e o r e m4 . 6i nS t o k e y
and Lucas, 1989, p.79). Moreover, the set of maximizers, G, is nonempty, closed, and upper-
hemicontinuous. Existence of the optimal decision, together with the characterization of
the steady-state distribution in section 6, establishes existence of an equilibrium.
13Shi (2006) also explores a similar feature in a directed search model of wage-tenure contracts.
13Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 2, there exists an equilibrium where all successful matches
are accepted. A suﬃcient condition for Assumption 2 to hold is that labor productivity
satisﬁes: y ≥ (1 + r)c
mH
mLλ(1/mH).
The suﬃcient condition for existence, stated in the lemma, implies that a worker prefers
getting the lowest feasible wage every period starting now to getting the full surplus from
a match every period starting next period. Intuitively, because of discounting, increasing
y acts as a higher search cost, making it more proﬁtable to accept a job today rather than
waiting. Note that, as in Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), we can reduce the restrictive
force of this condition by introducing a constant cost of search that an unemployed worker
must pay every period. By increasing a worker’s cost of rejecting an oﬀer, such a cost
enlarges the parameter region in which a worker always accepts a match.14
The following lemma describes additional properties of the value function (see Appendix
B for a proof):
Lemma 3.2. V is strictly increasing and strictly convex. As a result, V is almost every-
where twice diﬀerentiable with almost everywhere continuous ﬁrst derivative.
Strict convexity of the value function captures the feature that a more informative
search outcome is valuable to the worker. In a market with a higher x,w h e t h e rs e a r c h
succeeds or fails generates relatively larger contrasts which allow the worker to update his
beliefs more precisely. Convexity of the value function reﬂects the fact that such variations
in the posterior are valuable to the worker. However, more informative search reduces the
worker’s future payoﬀ in unemployment. This feature arises from the fact that a worker
continues to search only after he fails to ﬁnd a match. Learning is valuable to the worker
because it enables the worker to deduce that the market is worse than he expected. With
more informative search, the worker’s posterior beliefs will deteriorate more rapidly if he
does not ﬁnd a match, in which case the value of continuing to search will fall by more.
These interesting and inevitable consequences of learning from search cause analytical
diﬃculties. Mathematically, the future payoﬀ (1 − xμ)V (H(x,μ)) is convex in x,w h i c h
can make the objective function R(x,μ)c o n v e xi nx. Hence, the optimal decision is not
necessarily unique or interior. The possibility of multiple solutions implies that the value
function may not be diﬀerentiable at some levels of beliefs, although it is twice diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere. Because the objective function of the worker’s optimization problem
14For simplicity, we have not included such a cost of search for the workers in the following analysis.
14involves the value function in the future, it may not be diﬀerentiable either. Thus, the
ﬁrst-order condition may not be applicable to the workers’ optimization problem.
The possibility of multiple solutions and non-diﬀerentiability is well known in the lit-
erature on optimal learning (e.g., Easley and Kiefer, 1988). However, this literature has
either ignored these diﬃculties or focused on corner solutions (e.g., Balvers and Cosimano,
1993). We need to examine all solutions in order to establish the central result of declining
reservation wages. In diﬀerent modeling environments, there are techniques to generate
smooth optimal choices and diﬀerentiable value functions, e.g., Santos (1991). However,
those techniques require the value function to be concave, which is violated here.
4. Declining Reservation Wages
In this section, we establish the central result that a worker’s reservation wage increases in
the worker’s beliefs; i.e., w(μ) is an increasing function. Because a worker’s beliefs deteri-
orate with the duration of unemployment, monotonicity of w(μ)i m p l i e st h a tr e s e r v a t i o n s
wages decline over the spell of unemployment. By deﬁnition, w(μ)=W(g(μ)), where g(μ)
is a worker’s optimal choice of the submarket in which he searches under beliefs μ.T h u s ,
monotonicity of w(μ) is equivalent to the feature that g(μ) is a decreasing function, which
reﬂects the fact that a higher wage always comes together with a low matching probability.
We will ﬁrst use a heuristic approach to illustrate the desired result and then establish
the result formally. Before carrying out these analyses, it is convenient to transform the
worker’s choice from x to z ≡− x. The transformation will be useful in what follows,
and it enables us to attach the label monotone decisions naturally to the feature that z
increases in the beliefs. After the transformation, the objective function in (2.6) becomes
R(−z,μ)a n dt h ef e a s i b l es e to fc h o i c e si s−X 3 z.D e n o t eZ(μ)=a r gm a x z∈−X R(−z,μ)
and z(μ) ∈ Z(μ). Then, the set of optimal choices for x is G(μ)=−Z(μ)a n dat y p i c a l
selection is g(μ)=−z(μ).
4.1. A Heuristic Illustration of Monotone Optimal Choices
We use the ﬁrst-order condition as a heuristic illustration of monotonicity, although such
a condition is not applicable in general. To do so, suppose furthermore that the value
function is twice diﬀerentiable and the objective function R(−z,μ) is strictly concave in
the ﬁrst argument. In addition, suppose that the optimal choice is interior. Then, the
optimal choice, z(μ), is unique and obeys the following ﬁrst-order condition:
R1(−z(μ),μ)=0 . (4.1)
15In what follows, we will use the notation R1 and R11 to refer to the partial derivative of
R(−z,μ) with respect to the ﬁrst argument, rather than to z; and similarly for H(−z,μ).
Diﬀerentiating the previous equation, we obtain z0(μ)=R12/R11.B e c a u s eR11 < 0a s
we suppose here, then the desired result, z0(μ) > 0, holds if and only if R12 < 0. Writing












where H = H(−z(μ),μ). Because V 0 > 0, V 00 > 0, H1 < 0a n dH2 > 0, we can use part
(iv) of Lemma 2.2 to verify R12 < 0. Thus, z0(μ) > 0 indeed holds.
This illustration suggests that strict convexity of the value function should be important
for the optimal choice x = −z(μ) to be decreasing with μ. The intuition is as follows.
Searching in a market has the consequence of reducing the worker’s posterior beliefs when
search fails to generate a match. This is an implicit cost of search. Strict convexity of
the (future) value function implies that, for the same choice of x,t h i sc o s ti sh i g h e rw h e n
beliefs are at high levels than when beliefs are at low levels. Because the reduction in the
posterior beliefs increases with x, it is more costly to choose a high x when beliefs are high
than when beliefs are low. Roughly speaking, getting bad news about the market is more
damaging when the worker is optimistic than when the worker is pessimistic. Therefore, it
is optimal to increase x to generate more information as beliefs deteriorate. This explains
why g(μ) is decreasing and, hence, why z(μ) is increasing.
The illustration also suggests that monotonicity of z(μ) may depend only on the features
of the value function and the updating function, H. In contrast, the wage function does
not play any explicit role for the signs of R12 and z0(μ), provided that it induces the value
function to be increasing and convex. In particular, monotone choices do not require the
current payoﬀ, −μzW(−z), to have a positive cross partial derivative in (μ,z).
Both suggestions above hold true generally, even when the value function fails to be
diﬀerentiable. To establish the general result, we need a diﬀerent apparatus for the analysis.
4.2. Supermodularity and Monotone Optimal Choices
Supermodularity is a powerful method for conducting comparative statics. Topkis (1998)
formulated the theory of supermodularity, which has been applied to dynamic programming
(e.g., Amir et al., 1991). Milgrom and Shannon (1994) extended the theory from a cardinal
one to an ordinal one. In our model, supermodularity is equivalent to the feature of increas-
ing diﬀerences, because the variables under investigation, (z,μ), lie in closed intervals of
16the real line. Let z ∈ Z and μ ∈ M,w h e r eZ and M are partially ordered sets. A function
f(z,μ) has increasing diﬀerences in (z,μ)i ff(z1,μ1)−f(z1,μ2) ≥ f(z2,μ1)−f(z2,μ2)f o r
all z1 >z 2 and μ1 > μ2. If the inequality is strict, then f has strictly increasing diﬀerences.
In our model, Z, M and Z × M (under the product order) are all lattices. In this case,
the feature of increasing diﬀerences implies supermodularity (see Topkis, 1998, p.45).
It is far from obvious whether the concept of supermodularity can be usefully applied
here. On the economic side, our model does not have the usual reasons for supermod-
ularity, such as complementarity in consumption or production (see Topkis, 1998). On
the technical side, there are two features of our model that can complicate the use of su-
permodularity. First, as an inseparable feature of dynamic programming, the objective
function in (2.6) involves the future value function. A similar feature is present in models
of optimal growth. In order to apply the method of supermodularity, those models assume
that the current payoﬀ function is supermodular (e.g., Amir et al., 1991). In our model,
the current payoﬀ is −μzW(−z)/r. Neither is this function supermodular, nor is such su-
permodularity necessary for monotone optimal choices. Second, the future value function
is discounted with an endogenous factor, (1 + μz). Stern (2006) uses supermodularity in
optimal growth with endogenous discounting, but he assumes that the discount factor is
a concave function (also see Becker and Boyd, 1997, pp. 277-284). It is easy to see that
the discount factor in our model is not concave in (μ,z). Therefore, we cannot follow the
well-trodden path to establish supermodularity in our model.
Complicating the matter further, the objective function R(−z,μ) is unlikely to be su-
permodular. To see this, note that we obtained the result R12 < 0 in the above illustration
by substituting the ﬁrst-order condition. This means that the cross partial derivative of R
with respect to z and μ is positive locally at z = z(μ). The local property does not imply
the global property of supermodularity.
Fortunately, monotonicity of optimal choice is invariant to transformations of the ob-
jective function that are monotone in the choice variables. Thus, it becomes possible to
transform the objective function into a supermodular function. To that end, we transform




















17Denote Z(μ)=a r gm a x z∈−X ˆ R(z,μ)a n dz(μ) ∈ Z(μ). Clearly, the set of optimal choices
for x is G(μ)=−Z(μ) and a typical selection is g(μ)=−z(μ). Denote the greatest
selection of Z(μ)a s¯ z(μ) and the least selection as z(μ).
The following theorem states the result on monotonicity (see Appendix C for a proof):
Theorem 4.1. Let z ∈− X and μ ∈ M. The function ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular in
(z,μ). Thus, every selection z(μ) is an increasing function. Similarly, every selection g(μ)
is a decreasing function, and the wage w(μ) is an increasing function.
The main task in the proof of this theorem is to establish supermodularity of ˆ R,a f t e r
which monotonicity of z(μ) follows from Topkis (1998, p.79). Two aspects of the proof are
worth noting, both of which extend the features in the above heuristic illustration from
local properties to global ones. First, as expected, strict convexity of the value function
plays an important role for supermodularity of ˆ R and, hence, for monotone optimal choices.
Second, supermodularity of ˆ R relies only on the properties of the value function, V ,a n dt h e
updating function, H, not on those of the wage function, W. In particular, supermodularity
of ˆ R does not require the current payoﬀ function, −μzW(−z), to be supermodular.
Remark 1. There is another way to see why monotonicity of optimal choices does not rely
on the properties of W or on supermodularity of the original objective function, R(−z,μ).
As shown by Milgrom and Shannon (1994), monotone comparative static analysis requires
not supermodularity, but rather a weaker property – the single-crossing property. In
our model, R(−z,μ) has the strict single crossing property in (z,μ) if and only if ˆ R is
supermodular. Because W depends only on z, it drops out of the condition for the single
crossing property. In light of this remark, the result of monotone optimal choices also
follows from Theorem 40 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
The result of monotone optimal choices is a general one. It holds even when optimal
choices are corner solutions and when there are multiple solutions to the worker’s opti-
mization problem. When multiple solutions exist, every solution for z is an increasing
function of the beliefs. This strong result comes from the feature that ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly
supermodular. However, as a general result, the above theorem allows the possibility that
as o l u t i o nz(μ) is only a weakly increasing function. In the next section, we address strict
monotonicity and other issues.
185. Strict Monotonicity and Uniqueness of the Optimal Path
In order to understand the conditions under which reservation wages decline over a worker’s
unemployment spell, there are two further questions that need to be answered. First,
when are reservation wages strictly declining with unemployment duration? This stronger
property holds if and only if optimal choices, z(μ), are strictly increasing functions of the
beliefs. Second, if optimal choices are not unique, is there any discipline on the set of paths
of optimal choices? To answer these questions, we impose the following assumption, which
ensures optimal choices to be interior solutions:



















As shown in Appendix D, this assumption amounts to ensuring that R1(−1/mH,m L) >
0, so even a worker with beliefs μ = mL will ﬁnd it optimal to choose z>−1/mH.S i n c e
z(μ) is increasing, this assumption is suﬃcient for a workers’ choices to be interior along
the optimal path, starting at μ0 ∈ (mL,m H).
It should be noted that Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 can hold simultaneously for


























where the second inequality is the suﬃcient existence condition stated in Lemma 3.1. For






























To see that this condition can be satisﬁed, consider the examples in Example 2.1. When
the matching function is CES, the above condition holds provided ρ < 0. With ρ =0
(i.e., the Cobb-Douglas function), the condition also holds with α =1 /2a n dr +
mL
mH > 1.
Similarly, for the urn-ball matching function, the above condition is satisﬁed when r+1>
ea−1
a (1 − mLe−a)w h e r ea = λ(1/mH).
In Appendix D, we establish the following lemma.
19Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption 3, an unemployed worker’s optimal choices are interior.
Moreover, the derivative V 0(H(−z(μ),μ)) exists for all z(μ) ∈ Z(μ). Thus, optimal choices













In addition to ensuring interior solutions, this lemma describes a limited sense of dif-
ferentiability of the value function: the value function is diﬀerentiable in future periods
at particular posterior beliefs induced by optimal choices, i.e., along the path of optimal
choices. Despite the fact that the value function may still fail to be diﬀerentiable in the
ﬁrst period and at beliefs oﬀ the optimal paths, the limited sense of diﬀerentiability is
enough for the ﬁrst-order condition to be applicable in every period. In turn, the ﬁrst-
order condition enables us to establish strict monotonicity of optimal choices, as stated in
the following theorem (see Appendix E for a proof):
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption 3, every selection of optimal choices, z(μ), is a strictly
increasing function. Therefore, along every path of optimal choices, reservation wages are
strictly declining with unemployment duration.
As it is the case with supermodularity, strict monotonicity relies on the properties of
the functions V and H, but not those of the wage function W directly. Not surprisingly,
strict convexity of the value function plays a critical role for strict monotonicity of opti-
mal choices. It is worth noting that Amir (1996) also establishes strict monotonicity of
optimal choices, with the additional assumption that the value function is continuously
diﬀerentiable. We do not rely on this assumption because it does not hold in our model.
Let us now turn to the question about the set of optimal paths. When there are
multiple solutions, optimal ch o i c e sc a ne v o l v eo v e rt i m ei nm a n yw a y s . O n ec a s ei st h a t
multiple choices occur in every period, in which case the path of optimal choices branches
out. Another case is that multiplicity occurs only in the ﬁrst period. Clearly, the path
of optimal choices is more predictable in the second case than in the ﬁrst case. To know
more about the set of paths of optimal choices, we establish a link between multiplicity
of optimal choices and diﬀerentiability of the value function at all possible beliefs. The
following lemma states the link (see Appendix F for a proof):
Lemma 5.3. Maintain Assumption 3. For each μa in the interior of (mL,m H),l e tμ+
a
denote the limit to μa from the right (above) and μ−
a the limit from the left (below). Then,
20V 0(μ+
a )=R1(−¯ z(μa),μa) and V 0(μ−
a )=R1(−z(μa),μa).M o r e o v e r , V 0(μ+
a ) ≥ V 0(μ−
a ),
where the inequality is strict if and only if ¯ z(μa) >z (μa).
This lemma says that, at arbitrary beliefs μ ∈ (mL,m H), the value function is diﬀer-
entiable if and only if the beliefs induce a unique choice to be optimal. If multiple choices
are optimal at particular beliefs, then the right derivative of the value function is strictly
greater than the left derivative. Denote the set of such beliefs as
N = {μ ∈ (mL,m H):¯ z(μ) >z (μ)}.
Because V is almost everywhere twice diﬀerentiable, the set N has measure zero in M.
For any μ0 in the interior of M,l e t{μn}∞
n=0 be a path of beliefs generated by optimal
choices; i.e., μn = H(−z(μn−1),μn−1)w i t hz(μn−1) ∈ Z(μn−1), for n =1 ,2,....F o r
arbitrary initial beliefs, μ0, the following theorem characterizes the entire set of paths of
beliefs and optimal choices (see Appendix F for a proof):
Theorem 5.4. For any μ0 ∈ (mL,m H),l e tz(μ0) be an arbitrary selection from Z(μ0)
and let μ1 = H(−z(μ0),μ0) be the posterior beliefs induced by z(μ0).G i v e n μ1, μn is
unique, Z(μn) is a singleton, and V 0(μn) exists for all n =1 ,2,....I fμ0 / ∈ N,t h e nZ(μ0)
is also a singleton, in which case the entire path {μn}∞
n=0 is unique and V 0(μn) exists for






This theorem states that the paths of optimal choices and induced beliefs are unique
almost everywhere. The only case of non-uniqueness is when the worker’s initial prior lies
in the set N, which has measure zero. Even in this case, non-uniqueness occurs only in
the ﬁrst period of search. Given any optimal choice in the ﬁrst period and the induced
posterior, the future paths of optimal choice sa n di n d u c e db e l i e f sa r eu n i q u ef r o mt h a t
point onward. Thus, no matter where initial beliefs lie, the worker will choose search
decisions optimally to keep the beliefs out of the set N from the second period onward.
More precisely, whenever the search decision will induce the posterior beliefs to be close
to a particular level in the set N, it is optimal to modify the decision so as to keep the
posterior beliefs above that level. This result is a consequence of the value of learning, as
captured by strict convexity of the value function.
To understand why a worker chooses optimally to avoid the set N in future periods,
suppose counterfactually that the worker’s choice in some period n induces the posterior
beliefs to lie in N;t h a ti s ,μn+1 = H(−zn,μn) ∈ N for some n ≥ 0, where zn = z(μn). In
21this case, multiple choices will be optimal in period (n+1), which induce the left derivative
of V (μn+1) to be lower than its right derivative. Recall that the derivative of the future
value function captures an implicit (opportunity) cost of learning bad news. Thus, the
discrete fall in V 0(μn+1) from the right side of μn+1 to the left side implies that learning
slightly more about the market in the current period increases the cost of learning by a
discrete amount. The worker can avoid this discretely larger cost by choosing zn slightly
above z(μn), which will keep the posterior slightly above μn+1. In contrast to this discrete
increase in the beneﬁt ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ec o s to fzn is a marginal reduction in the matching
probability. Thus, the net gain from increasing zn slightly above z(μn) is positive. This
contradicts the optimality of zn.
6. Steady State Distributions and Duration Dependence
We now analyze the aggregate characteristics of the market. One purpose of this analysis
is to illustrate that the learning process in previous sections is consistent with aggregation.
The other purpose is to distinguish the duration dependence at an individual’s level from
the aggregate dependence.
Let ˆ U, E and L denote the economy-wide unemployment, employment and labor force
at the beginning of period t. The aggregate number of searchers in period t, denoted as U,
includes both ˆ U and the number of newborns, nL.L e tf denote the average job ﬁnding
rate in the economy. Denoting next period’s variables with a prime, we have:
U = ˆ U + nL, L = ˆ U + E, E
0 = E + fU, ˆ U
0 =( 1− f)U.
Use lowercase letters to denote the ratios of these variables to the labor force. Then,
u =ˆ u + n, 1=ˆ u + e, (1 + n)e = e + fu, (1 + n)ˆ u =( 1− f)u.















Now consider the distribution of unemployment durations in every local market with





22At the beginning of period t, the mass of unemployed workers who have already searched
for τ periods in a local market with matching eﬃciency mi, denoted by ˆ Ui,t(τ), is:
ˆ Ui,t(τ)=nLi,t−τQi(τ)
where Li,t−τ is the proportion of workers, among all those who were born τ periods before
t, who were allocated to a local market with matching eﬃciency mi. Because newborns are
allocated randomly to the local market, Li,t−τ = Lt−τ for all i,t,τ. Since all local markets
with the same matching eﬃciency have the same distribution of unemployment durations,
aggregating over the local markets yields the following mass of economy-wide unemployed
workers at the beginning of period t whose unemployment duration is equal to τ:
ˆ Ut(τ)=pˆ UH,t(τ)+( 1− p)ˆ UL,t(τ).


























Note that individuals know (U,L,E0, ˆ U0,f) and hence they know (u,n,e, ˆ u). They
also know ˆ Ut(τ)a n d[ pQH(τ)+( 1− p)QL(τ)], for each τ. However, they do not know
Qi(τ)o rˆ Ui,t(τ) for any τ. Since the functions W and λ are identical across local markets,
individuals cannot infer the distributions of unemployment durations and wages in their
own local markets and thus, they cannot infer the matching eﬃciency in their local markets.
The implications of the model for duration dependence are, in principle, ambiguous.
On the one hand, the matching probability of each unemployed worker rises with the
duration of his unemployment spell, for a given matching eﬃciency. Note, however, that
the workers’ permanent incomes, as described by the value of search V fall with the duration
of unemployment, even though each unemployed worker’s history exhibits positive duration
23dependence. On the other hand, the ratio of unemployed workers in mL-type local markets




















1 − mHx(μ(τ − 1))






Accordingly, a cross-section of all workers at any point in time may well be such that,
on average, workers who have been unemployed longer have lower probabilities of ﬁnding
a job in the current period. Again, this is so even though each unemployed worker’s
history exhibits positive duration dependence. A suﬃcient condition for the cross sectional
distribution of unemployed workers to exhibit negative duration dependence is mLg(mL) ≤
mHg(mH). In turn, using the ﬁrst order conditions for g(mL)a n dg(mH), it can be veriﬁed
that ˆ R1(g(mL),m L)= ˆ R1(g(mH),m H)=0i m p l i e st h a t
mHg(mH)=
⎡


























which is satisﬁed if [λ0(x) − λ(x)/x] is an increasing function of x.
To see that the above condition can be satisﬁed, consider ﬁrst the CES matching
function in Example 2.1. Then, the function [λ0(x)−λ(x)/x]i n c r e a s e si nx iﬀ (1−α)x−ρ > ρ.
As u ﬃcient condition is ρ ≤ 0. The condition is also satisﬁed for some positive values of
ρ that are close to 0. However, the condition is violated when ρ is suﬃciently close to
1. Next, consider the urn-ball matching function in Example 2.1. Then, the function
[λ0(x) − λ(x)/x] is always an increasing function.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed an equilibrium theory of declining reservation wages, in
which unemployed workers are faced with uncertainty that is associated directly with labor
market frictions. As a concrete way to formalize this type of uncertainty, we have assumed
24that individuals do not know precisely the matching eﬃciency given by the exogenous
matching technology. Faced with this uncertainty, workers learn about the probability of
ﬁnding a job through their private search histories. We examine this possibility in a labor
market equilibrium in which search is directed, workers know which wages are being oﬀered,
but they do not know the relevant wage distribution – that in their own local markets.
However, by severing the direct dependence of search behavior on the wage distribution,
the directed search framework simpliﬁes the task of determining the equilibrium wage
distribution and thus, the task of addressing jointly the workers’ search behavior, the
incentives to create jobs and the wage distribution.
In this context, we have shown how declining reservation wages over unemployment
spells arise as workers update their beliefs about the matching eﬃciency downwards with
the duration of unemployment. This formalizes a notion akin to that of discouragement,
as workers become more pessimistic about the probability of ﬁnding a job over their spell
of unemployment. Consequently, the wage distribution is non-degenerate, despite the facts
that matches are homogeneous and search is directed. Moreover, aggregate matching prob-
ability decreases with unemployment duration, in contrast to individual workers’ matching
probability, which increases over individual unemployment spells.
The diﬃculty in establishing these results is that learning generates non-diﬀerentiable
value functions and multiple solutions to a worker’s optimization problem. We have over-
come this diﬃc u l t yb ye x p l o r i n gac o n n e c t i o nbe t w e e nconvexity of a worker’s value function
and the property of supermodularity. A contribution of this paper is to establish such a
connection, which is likely to be usefully exploited in many other learning problems. Our
analysis diﬀe r sf r o mp r e v i o u sa p p l i c a t i o n so fs u p e r m o d u l a r i t y ,w h i c ho f t e ne m p h a s i z et h e
presence of complementarity in consumption or production. It is also diﬀerent from other
applications of supermodularity to dynamic problems, where the current payoﬀ function
is supermodular and the corresponding value is concave. In the present context neither
the worker’s current payoﬀ nor his objective function is supermodular and furthermore the
value function is convex, rather than concave.
Extensions of our model may consider workers’ labor force participation, job destruc-
tion and on-the-job-search. These theoretical extensions do not change the nature of our
analysis, but they may provide a useful structural framework for empirical studies of the
wage distribution and the distribution of unemployment durations.
25Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Given the analysis leading to Lemma 3.1, it suﬃces to show that the condition stated in the
lemma is indeed suﬃcient for Assumption 2. To see this, note that a suﬃcient condition
for V (μ)=m a x x∈X R(x,μ) ≥ maxx∈X Re(x,μ)f o ra l lμ ∈ M,w h e r eM =[ mL,m H]a n d







Using the deﬁnition of W, this condition can be written as









As u ﬃcient condition for this inequality to hold for all μ0 ∈ M is that it holds when
μ0 = mL, which gives the condition stated in the lemma. QED
B .P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 2
Let TV(μ) denote the right-hand side of (2.6). The value function, V ,i saﬁxed point of
the mapping T.L e tC1(M) be the set containing all bounded, continuous and increasing
functions on M.L e t Cs
1(M)b et h es u b s e to fC1(M) which contains strictly increasing
functions. Similarly, let C2(M)b et h es u b s e to fC1(M) which contains convex functions,
and Cs
2(M) be the subset of C2(M) which contains strictly convex functions. We need to
show that V ∈ Cs
1(M) ∩ Cs
2(M).
To show that V ∈ Cs
1(M), it suﬃces to show that T : C1(M) → Cs
1(M), which will be
accomplished by Lemma B.1 below. By the argument of contraction mapping, the ﬁxed
point of T is strictly increasing. Similarly, to prove V ∈ Cs
2(M), it suﬃces to show that
T : C2(M) → Cs
2(M), which will be accomplished by the last two lemmas in this proof.
Because a convex function is almost everywhere twice diﬀerentiable with almost everywhere
continuous ﬁrst derivative (see Lemma 3.2 in Rader, 1973), then V has these properties.
Let G(μ)=a r gm a x x∈X R(x,μ)a n dGe(μ)=a r gm a x x∈X Re(x,μ), where R is deﬁned
by (2.4) and Re by (2.5). Let g(μ) ∈ G(μ)a n dge(μ) ∈ Ge(μ). We next establish the
monotonicity of V .
Lemma B.1. T : C1(M) → Cs
1(M).
Proof.W e s h o w ﬁrst that T : C1(M) → C1(M), which implies V ∈ C1(M)b yt h e
contraction mapping theorem. Then we show that V = TV ∈ Cs
1(M). To establish these
results, pick an arbitrary V0 ∈ C1(M) and replace V with V0 in the deﬁnitions of R and Re.
Pick any μa,μb ∈ M with μa > μb.D e n o t egi = g(μi)a n dge
i = ge(μi), where i ∈ {a,b}.























These results and monotonicity of V0 imply Re(ge
b,μa) ≥ Re(ge
b,μb). Consider the case
where R(gb,μb)=Re(ge











The ﬁrst inequality comes from Assumption 2, the second inequality from the fact that
ge
a =a r g m a x x Re(x,μa), the third inequality from the result established above, and the
last equality from the hypothesis in the current case.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eR(gb,μb) >R e(ge
b,μb), the only remaining case that is consis-
tent with Assumption 2. Then, we have:
0 <R (gb,μb) − Re(ge
b,μb)














The ﬁrst inequality is the hypothesis in the current case; the second inequality comes from
the fact that ge
b ∈ argmaxxRe(x,μb); and the ensuing equality comes from the deﬁnitions
of R(x,μ)a n dRe(xe,μ) evaluated at (gb,μb). Note that for any μ such that R(g(μ),μ) >
Re(ge(μ),μ), we have g(μ) > 0: if g(μ) = 0, instead, then R(g(μ),μ)=H(μ)/(1 + r)=













Now, the procedure below establishes the desired result TV0(μa) >TV 0(μb):
R(ga,μa) − R(gb,μb) ≥ R(gb,μa) − R(gb,μb)




















The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that ga ∈ argmaxx R(x,μa), the second inequality
from the fact V0(H(gb,μa)) ≥ V0(H(gb,μb)), the third inequality from the above result on
W(gb), and the last inequality from V0 ∈ C1(M). This completes the proof of the statement
that T : C1(M) → C1(M).
Now we prove that V ∈ Cs
1(M), where V is the ﬁxed point of T. We need to show
that TV(μa) >TV(μb). If R(gb,μb) >R e(ge
b,μb), replacing V0 with V in the above proof
establishes TV(μa) >TV(μb). The only other case that is consistent with Assumption 2
is R(gb,μb)=Re(ge
b,μb). Because V (mH + mL −
mHmL
μb ) ≥ V (μb), we divide the proof in
this case further into the following two cases:
27Case 1. V (mH + mL −
mHmL


















The equality follows from the hypothesis in the current case and the inequality from the
fact that V (H(x,μb)) ≤ V (μb). Since V (μb)=R(gb,μb)=Re(ge
b,μb), the above inequality
would imply V (μb) ≤ 0. This would not be optimal for the worker because there exists x>
0 such that R(x,μb) > 0. Therefore, it must be true that V (μb)=R(gb,μb) >R e(ge
b,μb),
in which case V (μa) >V(μb), as shown above.
Case 2. V (mH + mL −
mHmL
μb ) >V(μb). Because V (μb) ≥ V (H(gb,μb)) and gb > 0
(otherwise, V (μb) ≤ 0, which contradicts the fact that V (μb) is a maximized value), the
current hypothesis implies that the last inequality in B.3 is strict, where V0 is replaced
with V . Hence, TV(μa) >TV(μb).
This completes the proof of Lemma B.1. QED
Lemma B.2. If V ∈ C2(M),t h e nR(x,μ) deﬁned by (2.4) is convex in μ for any given x.
If V ∈ Cs
2(M),t h e nR(x,μ) is strictly convex in μ.
Proof. We prove the second part of the lemma ﬁrst. Let V be a strictly convex
function. Let μa and μb be two arbitrarily values in M,w i t hμa > μb.L e tθ ∈ (0,1) be a
number. Denote μθ = θμa +( 1− θ)μb.W es h o wt h a t
R(x,μθ) < θR(x,μa)+( 1− θ)R(x,μb).





Note that σ ∈ (0,1) and σHa +( 1− σ)Hb = Hθ.I fV is strictly convex, then
V (Hθ) < σV (Ha)+( 1− σ)V (Hb). (B.4)





1+r [σV (Ha)+( 1− σ)V (Hb)]






∆a =( 1− μθx)σ − θ(1 − μax),
∆b =( 1− μθx)(1 − σ) − (1 − θ)(1 − μbx).
For i,j ∈ {a,b,θ}, we use (2.3) to compute:
σ =
(μθ − μb)(1 − μax)





Now it is easy to see that ∆a =0=∆b.T h e r e f o r e ,R is strictly convex.
If V is convex rather than strictly convex, then (B.4) holds as “ ≤ ”i n s t e a do f“< ”.
The rest of the proof can be adapted easily to show that R(x,μ) is convex, rather than
strictly convex. QED
28Lemma B.3. T : C2(M) → Cs
2(M).
Proof.P i c ka n yV0 ∈ C2(M). Denote V1(μ)=TV0(μ). Let μa and μb be two arbitrarily
values in M,w i t hμa > μb.L e tθ ∈ (0,1) be a number. Denote μθ = θμa +( 1− θ)μb.W e
need to show that
V1(μθ) < θV1(μa)+( 1− θ)V1(μb).
We divide the proof in two cases: the case where V0 is strictly convex and the case where
V0 has linear segments.
Case 1: V0 ∈ Cs
2(M). In this case, the previous lemma implies that R(x,μ) is strictly
convex in μ for any given x.D e n o t ex∗
i = maxxR(x,μi), i ∈ {a,b,θ}.T h a ti s ,V1(μi)=
R(x∗










= θV1(μa)+( 1− θ)V1(μb).
(B.5)
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that R is strictly convex in μ and the second
inequality from the fact that R(x,μi) ≤ R(x∗
i,μi)f o ra l lx.




θ,μb)), do not lie on the same linear segment of
V0,t h e nt h eﬁrst inequality in (B.5) is still strict and V1 is strictly convex. Suppose that
all three elements lie on the same linear segment of V0. Temporarily denote this linear
segment as V0(H)=A + BH,w i t hB>0( b e c a u s eV is strictly increasing). Using (2.3),
we can compute:
(1 − μx)V0(H)=( 1− μx)(A + BmH) − B(1 − mLx)(mH − μ).
This is linear and diﬀerentiable in (μ,x). Restrict μ to be such that V0(H(x,μ)) lies on the
linear segment described above. Using (2.8), we can verify that R(x,μ) is strictly concave





− A − BmH
#
+ BmL(mH − μ).















a,μa). The second inequality in (B.5) is strict, and so V1 is strictly
convex. This completes the proofs of the current lemma and Lemma 3.2. QED
29C .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . 1
Take arbitrary za,zb ∈− X and arbitrary μa,μb ∈ M,w i t hza >z b and μa > μb. Denote:
D =
h




ˆ R(zb,μa) − ˆ R(zb,μb)
i
.
We need to show D>0. Temporarily denote Hij = H(−zi,μj)a n dVij = V (Hij), where



















+( Vaa − Vab).
There are two cases to consider: μb = mL and μb >m L. First, suppose that μb = mL.
Then Vaa−Vba ≥ 0, with equality if and only if μa = mH; Vab −Vbb =0 ;a n dVaa−Vab > 0.
Hence, D>0 in this case. Next, consider the second case, where μb >m L.H e r et h e r ea r e
also two cases to consider: μa = mH and μa <m H. We start with the second case. Suppose
that μa <m H.B e c a u s eH1(−z,μ) < 0a n dH2(−z,μ) > 0, then Haa > max{Hab,H ba} ≥
































za−zb +( Haa − Hab).






















































The second equality comes from collecting terms according to (mH −μi). Hence, D>0i n



































Thus, the function ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular. Because −X is a lattice, the
monotone selection theorem in Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.8.4, p.79) implies that every se-
lection from Z(μ) is increasing. As a result, every selection g(μ)f r o mG(μ) is decreasing,
and w(μ)=W(g(μ)) is increasing. QED
30D. Proof of Lemma 5.1
First, we show that optimal choices are interior under Assumption 3. Consider the corner,
z = 0. For any prior beliefs, μ,t h ec h o i c ez = 0 yields zero expected wage in the period
and the posterior beliefs H(0,μ)=μ. The value of this choice is R(0,μ)=0 ,w h i c hc a n
be increased by any choice z<0. Thus, the choice z = 0 is never optimal.
Now consider the other corner, z = −1/mH. Since optimal choices are such that
z = −g(μ), and g(μ) is decreasing with μ,as u ﬃcient condition for z>−1/mH and,
equivalently, for g(μ) < 1/mH,i st h a tg(mL) < 1/mH.N o t et h a tg(mL)s o l v e s :






















where the wage function W is given by (2.7). To ensure that g(mL) < 1/mH,i ti ss u ﬃcient
that the objective function R(−z,mL) has a strictly positive derivative with respect to z
at z = −1/mH. After computing the derivative and substituting V (mL)f r o ma b o v ea n d



















where μ0 are the ﬁrms’ initial beliefs, which enter through W. This is the condition (5.1)
stated in Assumption 3.
Next, we show that V 0(H(−z(μ),μ)) exists. For any real number r,d e ﬁne r− =
limε↓0(r−ε)a n dr+ =l i m ε↓0(r+ε). Fix μ ∈ (mL,m H). Under Assumption 3, the optimal
choice z(μ) is interior. Such a solution satisﬁes ˆ R1(z−(μ),μ) ≥ ˆ R1(z+(μ),μ). Note that a
continuous, convex function has left and right derivatives. Because W(−z)i sc o n t i n u o u s ,

























Here we have used the fact that H1(−z,μ) < 0 – recall that H1 denotes the derivative
of H with respect to the ﬁrst argument, rather than z.S i n c e H1 < 0, then the feature













In turn, this implies that optimal choices in every period satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions.
QED
31E .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . 2
It suﬃces to show that the case z(μa) 6= z(μb)c a n n o to c c u rf o ra n yp a i r( μa,μb)w i t h
μa > μb. Suppose to the contrary that z(μa)=z(μb). Denote this common value as z∗.




Shorten the notation H(−z∗,μi)t oHi,w h e r ei ∈ {a,b}. Substituting ˆ R1(z∗,μi), we have:
(1 + r)
h
ˆ R1(z∗,μa) − ˆ R1(z∗,μb)
i











Because V (H) is continuous and strictly convex, and because V 0(Hb)e x i s t sb yL e m m a5 . 1 ,
we have: V (Ha) − V (Hb) >V0(Hb)(Ha − Hb). Then,
(1 + r)
∙
ˆ R1(z∗,μa)− ˆ R1(z∗,μb)
V 0(Hb)
¸























The ﬁrst inequality comes from substituting the inequality between the V ’s and the fact
that V 0 > 0; the second (strict) inequality comes from the facts that V is strictly convex,
Ha >H b,a n dH1 < 0. Denote the last expression temporarily as f(μa). Because f is











The second equality comes from property (iv) in Lemma 2.2. Because μa > μb,t h e n
f(μa) >f (μb)=0 .T h a ti s , ˆ R1(z∗,μa) > ˆ R1(z∗,μb). This result contradicts the supposi-
tion that z(μa)=z(μb). QED
F. Proofs of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.4
First, we prove the following lemma (which does require optimal choices to be interior):
Lemma F.1. ¯ z(μ) is right-continuous and z(μ) is left-continuous at each μ ∈ M.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary μ ∈ M.L e t{μn} be a sequence with μn → μ and μn ≥ μn+1 ≥
μ for all n. Because ¯ z(μ) is an increasing function, then {¯ z(μn)} is a decreasing sequence
and ¯ z(μn) ≥ ¯ z(μ) for all n.T h u s ,¯ z(μn) ↓ A for some A ≥ ¯ z(μ). On the other hand, the
Theorem of the Maximum (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989) implies that the correspondence
Z(μ) is upper hemicontinuous (uhc). Because μn → μ,a n d¯ z(μn) ∈ Z(μn)f o re a c hn,u h c
of Z implies that there is a subsequence of {¯ z(μn)} that converges to an element in Z(μ).
This element must be A, because all convergent subsequences of a convergent sequence
32must have the same limit. Thus, A ∈ Z(μ), and so A ≤ maxZ(μ)=¯ z(μ). Therefore,
¯ z(μn) ↓ A =¯ z(μ), which shows that ¯ z(μ) is right-continuous.
Similarly, by examining the sequence {μn} with μn → μ and μ ≥ μn+1 ≥ μn for all n,
we can show that z is left-continuous. This completes the proof of Lemma F.1.
Next, we prove Lemma 5.3. Fix μa ∈ (mL,m H). Because ¯ z(μ) maximizes R(−z,μ)f o r
each given μ,t h e n
V (μ)=R(−¯ z(μ),μ) ≥ R(−¯ z(μa),μ)
V (μa)=R(−¯ z(μa),μa) ≥ R(−¯ z(μ),μa).
Taking μ > μa,w h e r eμa <m H, and dividing the above inequalities by (μ−μa), we obtain:
R(−¯ z(μa),μ) − R(−¯ z(μa),μa)
μ − μa
≤
V (μ) − V (μa)
μ − μa
≤
R(−¯ z(μ),μ) − R(−¯ z(μ),μa)
μ − μa
.
Take the limit μ ↓ μa. Under Assumption 3, V 0(H(−¯ z(μa),μa)) exists for each μ (see
Lemma 5.1). Because ¯ z(μ) is right-continuous, then R1(−¯ z(μa),μa) exists. The limits of
the ﬁrst and last ratios are both R1(−¯ z(μa),μa). Thus, V 0(μ+
a )=R1(−¯ z(μa),μa).










Take the limit μ ↑ μa. Because z(μ) is left-continuous and interior, then V 0(μ−
a )=
R1(−z(μa),μa).
To establish the inequality between the left- and right- derivatives of V ,u s et h ed e ﬁn-
ition R(−z,μ)=μˆ U(z,μ)t oc o m p u t e :
R1(−z(μ),μ)= ˆ R(z(μ),μ)+μˆ U2(z(μ),μ)=V (μ)/μ + μˆ U2(z(μ),μ).
Because ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular, ˆ R2(¯ z(μa),μa) ≥ ˆ R2(z(μa),μa), where the inequal-
ity is strict if and only if ¯ z(μa) >z (μa). Therefore, V 0(μ+
a ) ≥ V 0(μ−
a ), where the inequality
is strict if and only if ¯ z(μa) >z (μa). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.3.
Finally, we prove Theorem 5.4. Given any selection z(μ0) ∈ Z(μ0) and the induced
beliefs μ1 = H(−z(μ0),μ0), Lemma 5.1 implies that V 0(μ1) exists. Then, Lemma 5.3
implies ¯ z(μ1)=z(μ1). That is, Z(μ1)={z(μ1)} is a singleton. So, the posterior beliefs
induced by Z(μ1) are unique and are given by μ2 = H(−z(μ1),μ1). Again, Lemma 5.1
implies that V 0(μ2) exists and Lemma 5.3 implies that ¯ z(μ2)=z(μ2). Repeating this
argument shows that μn is unique, Z(μn)i sas i n g l e t o n ,a n dV 0(μn)e x i s t sf o ra l ln =1 ,2,....
If μ0 / ∈ N,t h e n¯ z(μ0)=z(μ0)b yt h ed e ﬁnition of N. In this case, the posterior beliefs
μ1 = H(z(μ0),μ0) are unique. Also, Lemma 5.3 implies that V 0(μ0) exists. If μ0 ∈ N,
again, the results stated in Theorem 5.4 follow from Lemma 5.3. QED
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